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SEC Disciplinary Proceedings Against Attorneys 
Under Rule 2(e) 
Congress has never expressly authorized the Securities and Ex-
change Commission to regulate or discipline attorneys. 1 Neverthe-
less, for more than thirty years the Commission has debarred2 
certain attorneys from the practice of securities law through proceed-
ings under rule 2(e) of its Rules of Practice.3 Before 1970, the Com-
mission rarely initiated rule 2( e) proceedings against lawyers, 
applying its sanctions primarily to attorneys whose conduct consti-
tuted particularly egregious violations of SEC rules or procedures. 
Since 1970, however, the frequency of rule 2( e) proceedings against 
attorneys has increased dramatically. The Commission has begun to 
use the rule to coerce securities lawyers to monitor their clients' be-
havior more closely, thereby augmenting the limited resources of the 
SEC staff. Commentators have severely criticized the expanded use 
of rule 2(e)4 because it both chills effective representation of clients 
and empowers the SEC to define the professional responsibilities of 
attorneys - a function traditionally left to courts and bar associa-
tions. Although the Commission has not been entirely unresponsive 
to these criticisms, 5 it continues to assert its authority to punish se-
I. The Senate once considered a bill that would have granted authority to discipline attor-
neys to all administrative agencies. The Reform of Federal Regulation Act of 1979, S. 262, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(a) (1979), would have amended 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) to authorize 
agencies to: 
prohibit any individual from appearing before the agency or its responsible employees 
whenever such individual refuses to adhere to reasonable standards of orderly and ethical 
conduct, or continues, despite agency requests to the contrary, to engage in the deliberate 
use of dilatory tactics, . . . or the repeated failure of the individual to be in attendance, or 
to make witnesses available, when the presence of such individual or witnesses is neces-
sary to the orderly progress of the proceeding. 
Congress did not pass the bill. 
2. The term "debar" is used in this note to disµnguish the limited nature of SEC sanctions: 
the Commission debars attorneys from securities practice, but cannot disbar them from the 
practice of law entirely. 
3. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1980). 
4. See, e.g., Downing & Miller, The Distortion and Misuse of Rule 2(e), 54 NOTRE DAME 
LAW. 774 (1979); Johnson, The Expanding Responsibilities of Attorneys in Practice Before the 
SEC: Disciplinary Proceedings Under Rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 25 MER· 
CER L. REv. 637 (1974); Marsh, Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 35 Bus. LAW. 987 (1980). 
5. In a recent decision, William R. Carter, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 22 
SEC DOCKET 292 (Feb. 28, 1981), the Commission reversed an administrative law judge's 
findings that two attorneys willfully violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by failing to 
convince recalcitrant management to disclose material facts, and to report their views to the 
board of directors after management refused to disclose. The administrative law judge had 
suspended Carter and Johnson from SEC practice for periods of one year and nine months, 
respectively. See William R. Carter, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,724, 17 SEC 
DocKET 294 (1979). Ruling that the record did not support the administrative law judge's 
findings, the Commission held that "[s]o long as a lawyer is acting in good faith and exerting 
1270 
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curities lawyers who fail to conform to "generally recognized norms 
of professional conduct."6 
This Note reassesses SEC authority to discipline attorneys under 
rule 2( e ). Part I explores the history of rule 2( e) proceedings against 
attorneys and the troublesome policy issues raised by the SEC's new 
approach to rule 2(e) enforcement. Part II examines the SEC's claim 
that general rulemaking provisions give it authority to discipline at-
torneys. The Note concludes that a proper construction of statutes 
and case law bars rule 2( e) proceedings against attorneys. 
I. THE HISTORY OF RULE 2(e) PROCEEDINGS 
AGAINST ATTORNEYS 
The Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated rule 2( e) 
of its Rules of Practice less than a year after its creation by Congress 
in 1934.7 The rule originally established an "S.E.C. Bar''8 by requir-
ing that attorneys be admitted to practice before the Commission 
and provided grounds for discipline of attorneys, accountants, and 
other professionals practicing before the Commission. In 1938, the 
Commission eliminated the admissions requirement, but retained 
the disciplinary provisions.9 The rule then provided that the Com-
mission could deny the privilege of "appearing or practicing before it 
in any way to any person who is found . . . (1) not to possess the 
requisite qualifications to represent others; or (2) to be lacking in 
character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper 
professional conduct." 10 
In practice, the Commission staff typically identifies an attorney 
or accountant who it believes should be punished under rule 2( e ), 
and an administrative law judge then conducts a nonpublic hearing 
on the matter. 11 The judge may then issue a ruling that temporarily 
or permanently suspends the accountant's or attorney's right to prac-
tice before the Commission. A rule 2( e) suspension bars an attorney 
not only from arguing before the Commission and preparing state-
ments or papers to be filed with it, 12 but also from rendering any 
reasonable efforts to prevent violations of the law by his client, his professional obligations 
have been met." William R. Carter, 22 SEC DOCKET 323. 
6. See William R. Carter, 22 SEC DOCKET 319. 
7. The Commission was created by the Securities Exchange Act ,of 1934, ch. 404 § 4, 48 
Stat. 881, 885 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1976)). 
8. Rule Il(h), [1935] SEC ANN. REPT. 45-46. See William R. Carter, 22 SEC DOCKET 296. 
9. Securities Act Release No. 1761 (June 27, 1938). 
IO. See William R. Carter, 22 SEC DOCKET 297 n.17. 
11. See Marsh, supra note 4, at 993-1005, for a detailed description of rule 2(e) procedures. 
12. See rule 2(g), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(g) (1980), which states that "practicing before the 
Commission" "shall include but shall not be limited to": 
(1) transacting any business with the Commission; and (2) the preparation of any state-
ment, opinion or other paper by any attorney, accountant, engineer or other expert, filed 
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legal advice concerning the federal securities laws, .even to clients 
who transact no business with the Commission.13 A suspension may 
be appealed to the full Commission, but appeals were rare until 
quite recently. 14 
Although legislation gives the Commission authority to employ a 
variety of techniques to administer the securities laws - including 
the power to investigate violations of the securities laws, to publish 
information concerning such violations, 15 to bring actions in the 
United States district courts to enj<;>in violations, 16 and to refer evi-
dence to the Attorney General for criminal prosecutions17 - no pro-
vision expressly authorizes the Commission to discipline attorneys.18 
The Commission, therefore, has had to justify rule 2( e) by reference 
to general provisions in each of the securities statutes that authorize 
the Commission to promulgate rules and regulations to implement 
those statutes.19 
Until 1970, rule 2(e) proceedings were infrequent. During the 
with the Commission in any registration statement, notification, application, report or 
other document with the consent of such attorney, accountant, engineer, or other expert. 
13. See, e.g., Richard D. Hodgin, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,225, 18 SEC 
DOCKET 458 (Sept. 27, 1979). 
14. Attorneys must exhaust their administrative remedies within the Co=ission before 
they can challenge rule 2(e) proceedings in the courts. See Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 
F.2d 570, 575 (2d Cir. 1979). 
15. E.g., Stirling Homex Corp., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,516, 7 SEC DOCK-
ET 298 (July 2, 1975). Persons injured by such violations may bring a civil action for damages 
under the Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1976), or the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976). 
16. E.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Universal Major 
Indus. Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~95,229 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), 
affd., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977). 
17. E.g., United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1972). Criminal penalties are 
imposed under the Securities Act of 1933, § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1976) and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ft' (1976 & Supp. I 1977). 
18. Only three unassociated provisions of the six principal federal securities laws mention 
lawyers. The first reference occurs in the 1933 Securities Act. The Act requires registration 
statements to include (1) ''the names and addresses of counsel who have passed on the legality 
of the issue," and (2) "a copy of the opinion or opinions of counsel in respect to the legality of 
the issue." Securities Act of 1933, Schedules A(23), A(29), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa, Schedules A(23), 
A(29) (1976). Congressional hearings on the 1933 Act do not even mention these provisions. 
See 1 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 
AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at xxvii-xxvili (1973). The second reference 
similarly requires an opinion of counsel for an indenture to qualify under the Trust Indenture 
Act of 1939. See Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 314(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77nnn(c)(2) (1976). The 
third reference simply excludes lawyers who give investment advice as an incident to their 
legal practice from the definition of "investment adviser" under the Investment Advisors Act 
of 1940. See Investment Advisors Act of 1940, § 202(a)(ll)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 806-2(1l)(B) 
(1976). 
None of these references purports to authorize SEC regulation of securities lawyers. See 
Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 
463 (1974); So=er,Professional Responsibility: How JJid We Gel Here?, 30 Bus. LAW. 95, 100 
(Spec. ed. Mar. 1975). 
19. See Marsh, supra note 4, at 1004-05. 
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first fifteen years after the rule was promulgated, the Commission 
employed rule 2(e) disciplinary proceedings only against accoun-
tants.20 During this period the Commission relied on other remedies 
for attorney misconduct - injunctions from district courts where at-
torneys were violating the securities laws, and state bar association 
disciplinary proceedings where the conduct violated attorney ethics 
codes. It did not proceed against an attorney until 1950.21 Between 
1950 and 1960, the Commission initiated four proceedings against 
attorneys. In each case the attorney had intentionally misled the 
Commission: one attorney prepared and filed materially misleading 
documents,22 another gave false testimony in an SEC investigation,23 
a third filed a notification containing financial statements he knew to 
be false,24 and the last intentionally concealed information sug-
gesting that an accountant who had certified a registration statement 
was not independent. 25 During the I 960s there were ten rule 2( e) 
proceedings against lawyers, each involving intentional failure to 
disclose material information to the Commission. 26 
In 1970 the SEC amended rule 2(e) to add a third ground for 
debarment: willful violation or aiding or abetting a violation of the 
federal securities laws.27 Since that amendment, the number of rule 
2( e) proceedings against attorneys has increased substantially; more 
than forty proceedings have been reported in the past ten years.28 
The variety of conduct punishable under rule 2( e) has expanded as 
well. In the mid-1970s, the SEC began attacking lawyers for failing 
to ensure that their clients made full disclosure. In several cases, 
attorneys were temporarily suspended for failing to detect and pre-
20. The SEC is authorized to promulgate accounting standards. See Securities Act of 
1933, § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1976). This provision may imply that Congress intended the 
SEC to discipline accountants, justifying the result in Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 
(2d Cir. 1979), and distinguishing the use of rule 2(e) against accountants from its use against 
attorneys. See, Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,982, 
17 SEC DOCKET 1149, 1158-59 (July 2, 1979) (Karmel, Commr., dissenting). 
21. See Albert J. Fleischman, 37 SEC 832 (1950). 
22. Albert J. Fleischman, 37 SEC 832 (1950). 
23. William A. Dougherty, 38 SEC 82 (1957) (SEC investigation of political contributions). 
24. James T. DeWitt, 38 SEC 879 (1959). 
25. Sal M. Alpher, 39 SEC 346 (1959). See Kemp, Disciplinary Proceedings by the S.E. C 
Against Attorneys, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 23, 27-32 (1965); Comment, SEC Disciplinary Rules 
and the Federal Securities Laws: The Regulation, Role and Responsibilities of the Attorney, 1972 
DUKE LJ. 969, 983. 
26. See, e.g., Marshall I. Stewart, Securities Act Release No. 4829 (Apr. 29, 1966); Ronald 
H. Freemond, Securities Act Release No. 4736 (Oct. 9, 1964); Erwin Pincus, Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 6419 (June 27, 1963). 
27. See Securities Act Release No. 5088, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 
~77,913 (Sept. 24, 1970) (adding rule 2(e)(l)(iii)). 
28. Klein, The SEC and The Legal Profession: Material Adverse Developments, 9 ELEV-
ENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 612 (Practicing Law Inst. No. 319 
1979) (reporting 43 rule 2(e) proceedings against attorneys between 1970 and 1979). 
1274 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:1270 
vent their clients' securities violations. 29 In one of these cases, the 
Commission disciplined a law firm for failing to investigate suffi-
·ciently to discover that its partner, former partner, and a client had 
filed inaccurate and incomplete information, and required the firm 
to adopt internal procedures that would ensure full disclosure. 30 In 
these and other cases, the Commission has used its disciplinary pro-
ceedings not so much to assess professional fitness as to conscript 
lawyers to prevent violations. 
There are various reasons for this new and expanded use of rule 
2(e) proceedings. The Commission has limited staff and resources 
available to devote to securities law enforcement,31 and along with 
private plaintiffs, it has suffered declining success in enforcing the 
laws in the courts.32 By relying on intra-agency disciplinary pro-
ceedings rather than civil litigation, the Commission remedies both 
of these problems: it can apply its own standards to define miscon-
29. See, e.g., Lloyd Feld, Securities Act Release No. 11,775 (Oct. 30, 1975); Jo M. Fergu-
son, Securities Act Release No. 5523 (Aug. 21, 1974). 
30. Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,982, 17 SEC 
DOCKET 1149 {July 2, 1979). 
31. See Emanuel Fields, 45 SEC 262 (1973), qffd, 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1974), where 
the Commission stated: 
Members of this Commission have pointed out time and time again that the task of en-
forcing the securities laws rests in overwhelming measure on the bar's shoulders. These 
were statements of what all who are versed in the practicalities of securities law know to 
be a truism, ie., that this Commission with its small staff, limited resources, and onerous 
tasks is peculiarly dependent on the probity and diligence of the professionals who prac-
tice before it . . . [U]nscrupulous lawyers can inflict irreparable harm on those who rely 
on the disclosure documents they produce. Hence we are under a duty to hold our bar to 
appropriately rigorous standards of professional honor. 
45 SEC at 266 n.20. 
32. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court held that 
plaintiffs must prove scienter to succeed in private damage actions under rule lOb-5. Fearing 
that the courts would extend Hochfelder to SEC suits seeking civil injunctions, the Commis-
sion turned to rule 2(e) proceedings, where it decided what level of intent is prerequisite to a 
violation. Analyzing the effect of Hochfelder on injunctive actions, the General Counsel ob-
served: "[I)t may be appropriate for the Commission to place greater reliance upon Rule 2(e) 
in the future as a means of preventing a recurrence of unethical or improper conduct." Memo-
randum to Chairman Hills (June 8, 1976), Staff Study, Senate Subcomm. on Reports, Account-
ing and Management, App. I, at 1472 n.2 (1976), reprinted in Miller, The .Distortion and Misuse 
of Rule 2(e), 1 SEC. REo. L.J. 54, 63 (1979). In a subsequent memorandum, the General 
Counsel stated: 
There may be cases where, as a consequence of Hochfelder, negligent conduct by an ac-
countant or attome)' which injured investors may not constitute a violation of section 
lO(b) and Rule 101).:5, nor otherwise violate the securities law, yet represent a substantial 
threat to the public interest if such conduct were to continue in the future. If this conduct 
would amount to a significant deviation from professional standards, a proceeding under 
Rule 2(e) to test the individual's fitness to continue to be permitted to practice before the 
Commission might be appropriate. 
SEC Office Memorandum (Aug. 27, 1976), Staff Study, Senate Subcomm. on Reports, Ac-
counting, and Management, App. I, at 1508 (1976), reprinted in Miller, supra, at 64. 
The Supreme Court later held in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), that scienter is an 
element of a violation of§ lO(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and§ 17(a){l) of 
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q{a)(l) (1976), but not of§§ 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the 1933 Act, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(2) and 77q(a)(3) (1976). 
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duct under the securities laws, and its staff can rely more heavily on 
the bar to enforce the laws because of the increased threat of discipli-
nary action. A former Commission chairman acknowledged the en-
forcement purpose of rule 2( e) in public speeches, 33 even as the 
Commission denied such a purpose in litigation contesting its disci-
plinary powers. 34 
That litigation is becoming more common as attorneys and com-
mentators begin to recognize the implications of the SEC's new ap-
proach to attorney discipline.35 Two effects of the SEC's approach 
are particularly disturbing. First, SEC proceedings against attorneys 
may undermine the adversary system and the client's right to effec-
tive counsel. According to the Code of Professional Responsibility 
the lawyer must "represent his client zealously within the bounds of 
the law."36 This duty guarantees to clients in civil cases what the 
sixth amendment guarantees in criminal proceedings: the right to 
have the "effective assistance of counsel."37 The right to effective 
counsel arises from the unique role that lawyers play in the adver-
sary system.38 To protect this right, the Supreme Court has long pro-
hibited unreasonable intrusions into the adversary system39 and 
protected the Bar's independence.40 
33. See Speech by Chairman Garret, Professional Responsibility and the Securities Laws, 
State Bar of Texas (July 4, 1974), reprinted in Cheek, Professional Responsibility and Se!f-Regu-
lation of the Securities Lawyer, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 597, 600 n.9 (1975): 
In fact, any well organized scheme of violation almost surely involves cooperative partici-
pation by such professions [lawyers and accountants]. Simply as a matter of enforcement 
technique, ifwe can induce the professionals to be less cooperative, we will prevent many 
violations that would otherwise occur. And what are the available means to bring this 
about? Exhortation, injunctive actions and Rule 2(e) disbarment proceedings. The Com-
mission has adopted a conscious program to improve professional performance by the use 
of these means. Even if certain businessmen are not moved to fear compliance by ethical 
considerations or the fear of punishment, they will do far less damage if their lawyers and 
accountants won't play. This is our policy objective. But, of course, we must seek it only 
through already supportable means as provided by law. 
34. See note 114 infra and accompanying text. 
35. See Comment, supra note 25, at 985. 
36. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-1. 
37. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942). 
38. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979). 
39. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring): "[A] 
common law trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding. Discovery was hardly 
intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits 
borrowed from the adversary." 
40. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). The Court stated: "A bar composed 
of lawyers of good character is a worthy objective but it is unnecessary to sacrifice vital free-
doins m order to obtain that goal. It is also important both to society and the bar itself that 
lawyers be unintimidated - free to think, speak, and act as members of an Independent Bar." 
353 U.S. at 273 (footnote oinitted). q: Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405-07 (1956). 
In Cammer, the Court held that a lawyer is not the kind of"officer'' who can be tried summa-
rily under 18 U.S.C. § 401(2), which empowers federal courts to punish "[m]isbehavior of any 
of its officers in their official transactions." 350 U.S. at 399-400 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 401(2)). 
The Court relied on legislative history indicating that Congress opposed use of the contempt 
sanction against attorneys because they viewed it as a threat to the independence of the bar. 
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Subject to discipline by an adversary, the lawyer may become 
less willing to represent clients vigorously. Ordinarily, the lawyer 
states the position most favorable to his client as long as he believes 
there is a reasonable basis for that position.41 But securities practice 
requires judgments on difficult legal questions in areas where the law 
offers uncertain guidance.42 If a lawyer believes that he will be sub-
ject to suspension or debarment if he fails to discover and prevent 
violations in these uncertain areas, he can hardly be expected to rep-
resent his client's interest with the same zeal, particularly when ad-
vocating debatable positions.43 Instead, he may limit his advice to 
conservative interpretation of the law, especially prior to litigation, 
when the SEC views the attorney's adversarial role as professionally 
irresponsible.44 
Second, rule 2( e) threatens the balance between state and federal 
law by federalizing professional responsibility. In Santa Fe Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Greene, the Supreme Court refused to extend rule 1 Ob-5 
41. Cf. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 314 (1965) (describing 
advocacy of lawyers in tax field). 
42. Consider such deliberately imprecise concepts in laws administered by the SEC as 
"materiality," "control," "adequate disclosure," "average prudent man," "manipulative or de-
ceptive device or contrivance," and "untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances in 
which they were made, not misleading." Statement of Policy Adopted by American Bar Asso-
ciation Regarding Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers in Advising with Respect to the 
Compliance by Clients with Laws Administered by the Securities and Exchange Co=ission, 
31 Bus. LAW. 543, 546 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report]. 
43. The American Bar Association has noted that: 
Efforts by the government to impose responsibility upon lawyers to assure the quality of 
their clients' compliance with the law or to compel lawyers to give advice resolving all 
doubts in favor of regulatory restrictions would evoke serious and far-reaching disruption 
in the role of lawyer as counselor, which would be detrimental to the public, clients, and 
the legal profession. 
ABA Report, supra note 42, at 545. 
The SEC has repeatedly argued that "simple mistakes in judgment" would not subject the 
lawyer to discipline. See, e.g., Garrett, New .Directions in Professional Responsiln1ity, 29 Bus. 
LAW. 7, 12-13 (Spec. ed. Mar. 1974); Sonde, Professional Responsibility-A New Religion, or 
the Old Gospel?, 24 EMORY L.J. 827, 849 (1975). Nevertheless, the SEC's chairman has ac-
knowledged that the Commission uses "overly crude weapons" to intimidate lawyers. Garrett, 
supra, at 12-13; Freedman, A Civil Libertarian Looks al Securities Regulation, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 
280, 285 (1974). In one case, an attorney who was vigorously advocating his client's rights was 
advised to "take a look at the National Student Marketing complaint," in which attorneys 
were named as defendants. Garrett, supra, at 10. 
44. Daley & Karmel, Allomeys' Responsibilities: Adversaries al the Bar of lhe SEC, 24 
EMORY L.J. 747, 765-67 (1975). The SEC has rationalized its position against the adversary 
system by distinguishing the lawyer's adversarial and advisory roles. Commissioner So=er 
has stated: 
There is a difference between an advisor and an advocate. An advocate deals with the 
past and he deals with the past conduct of his client when that conduct is questioned in 
court. On the other hand the lawyer is serving as an advisor in looking to the future. 
Id. at 765 n.88 (quoting So=er, Lawyers- Where .Does Responsibility Fall in Cases of Private 
Placement?, COM. & FINANCIAL CHRONICLE, July 8, 1974, at 7.). A strong argument can be 
made, however, that the attorney's duty to act as an adversary arises from the first contact with 
the SEC. Id. at 765-67. 
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to conduct traditionally left to state regulation, absent a clear indica-
tion of congressional intent.45 Like corporation law in Santa Fe In-
dustries, professional responsibility has traditionally arisen from 
state common law.46 Rule 2(e) may override established state poli-
cies; SEC decisions and pronouncements indicate that the Commis-
sion is willing independently to define the requirements of the norms 
of professional responsibility.47 The courts should be reluctant to 
imply such a derogation of the state law of professional responsibil-
ity. 
Despite these.objections to the Commission's use of rule 2(e), the 
courts and the Commission have not questioned the SEC's authority 
to discipline attorneys. In one recent case, Touche Ross & Co. v. 
SEC,48 Judge Timbers of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held the Commission's authority to discipline accountants under rule 
2(e). Broad dicta suggest that the opinion applies to attorneys as 
well. Judge Timbers stated that SEC disciplinary proceedings 
against accountants and attorneys could be implied from the Com-
mission's general rulemaking authority. The general rulemaking 
provision, he reasoned, vested the SEC with broad authority to "pro-
tect investors against fraud or deception made possible by constantly 
changing conditions."49 He concluded that disciplinary proceedings 
promote this purpose of ensuring "full disclosur~ of material inf or-
mation concerning public offerings of securities in commerce."50 
The SEC has enthusiastically endorsed the Second Circuit's 
broad interpretation of its rulemaking authority. In William R 
Carter,51 the Commission reversed an administrative law judge's 
controversial decision to suspend temporarily two attorneys under 
rule 2(e). The attorneys had aided and abetted a securities law viola-
45. 430 U.S. 462, 478-80 (1977). The Court stated that while "there may well be a need for 
uniform federal fiduciary standards to govern mergers . . . . those standards should not be 
supplied by judicial extension of§ lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 to 'cover the corporate universe.'" 
430 U.S. at 479-80 (citation omitted). See also Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), in 
which the Court stated that: ''Without explicit action by lawmakers, decisions of great consti-
tutional import and effect would be relegated by default to administrators who, under our 
system of government, are not endowed with authority to decide them." 360 U.S. at 507. The 
Court added that such decisions require "careful and purposeful considerations by those re-
sponsible for enacting and implementing our laws." 360 U.S. at 507. 
46. Daley & Karmel, supra note 44, at 749. 
41. See William R. Carter, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC DOCKET 
292, 322-23 (Feb. 28, 1981). q: Gruenbaum, Clients' Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obligations: 
A Response to Professor Kramer, 68 GEO. L.J. 191, 201 (1979) (arguing that the SEC disci-
plines lawyers who would not be subject to discipline under the ABA Code of Professional 
Responsibility). 
48. 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979). 
49. 609 F.2d at 580 (quoting R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127, 132 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962)). 
50. 609 F.2d at 580 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976)). 
51. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC DocKET 319 (Feb. 28, 1981). 
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tion by failing to ensure that their recalcitrant client disclosed mate-
rial facts.52 Although the Commission rejected the administrative 
law judge's interpretation of rule 2( e) - an interpretation that would 
have required attorneys to act in situations where the ABA Code of 
Professional Responsibility left conduct to attorney discretion53 - it 
nevertheless asserted that it had broad power to discipline attorneys 
who failed to comply with "generally recognized norms of profes-
sional conduct."54 The Commission's decision clearly indicates that 
it will continue to define what those norms require in the securities 
context. The Commission emphatically rejected this challenge to its 
authority to promulgate rule 2(e).55 
The foundations of SEC authority to discipline attorneys may 
not be as solid as the Second Circuit and the Commission assume. 
The general rulemaking provisions are subject to a narrower inter-
pretation, and the cases cited by Judge Timbers can be plausibly dis-
tinguished. Given the troublesome policy implications of recent rule 
2(e) enforcement, a reexamination of the SEC's authority to promul-
gate the rule seems long overdue. 
II. RULE 2(e) AND THE SEC's GENERAL 
RULEMAKING AUTHORITY 
Although attorneys are integrally involved in the marketing and 
sale of securities, 56 only three isolated provisions of the six principal 
federal securities laws mentioned lawyers.57 No provision indicates 
that Congress contemplated administrative disciplinary proceedings 
against lawyers. To justify rule 2(e) proceedings, the SEC has there-
fore relied on provisions in each of the securities laws that authorize 
the Commission to promulgate "such rules and regulations as may 
be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this ti-
tle."58 From these general rulemaking provisions, proponents of rule 
2(e) have constructed three distinct justifications for the rule. First,. 
they have argued that because these provisions give the Commission 
authority to prescribe the procedures by which its business will be 
conducted, they also give the Commission the inherent authority to 
discipline attorneys who fail to comply with those procedures. Sec-
ond, they assert that rule 2(e) proceedings are "necessary and appro-
52. See note 5 supra. 
53. See Marsh, supra note 4, at 996. 
54. 22 SEC DOCKET at 319. 
55. 22 SEC DOCKET 294. 
56. While the statutory role of securities lawyers seems minimal, their practical role is 
significant Securities lawyers are often involved in disclosure decisions on a day-to-day basis; 
they draft, revise, and comment on disclosure documents, and file them with the Commission. 
22 SEC DOCKET 321. 
51. See note 18 supra. 
58. See William R. Carter, 22 SEC DocKET at 296 n.13; Marsh, supra note 4, at 1005. 
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priate" because they promote the statutory objective of adequate 
disclosure to investors. Finally, they argue that however weak the 
justifications based on general rulemaking provisions may be, con-
gressional reenactment of those provisions indicates legislative ap-
proval of rule 2( e ). As the analysis below indicates, each of these 
justifications is flawed. 
A. Inherent Authority 
The SEC has asserted that it has "inherent" power to discipline 
attorneys who fail to comply with the rules and procedures that it 
has legitimately promulgated pursuant to its general rulemaking au-
thority.59 Judge Timbers endorsed this reasoning in Touche Ross: 
"Rule 2(e) thus represents an attempt by the SEC essentially to pro-
tect the integrity of its own processes."60 To support this "inherent 
authority" argument, both Judge Timbers and the Commission61 
cited a series of judicial decisions rejecting challenges to the discipli-
nary authority of other agencies. The inherent authority argument 
collapses after a careful examination of those cases. 
The Touche Ross opinion cited three cases upholding inherent 
agency authority to discipline attorneys. In Goldsmith v. Board of 
Tax Appeals,62 the Supreme Court indicated that this "quasi-judi-
cial" agency had authority to "limit those who appear before it to 
represent the interest of tax-payers."63 In Herman v . .Dulles,64 the 
District of Columbia Circuit upheld the authority of the Interna-
tional Claims Commission to revoke an attorney's right to practice 
before it. And in Koden v. United States .Department of Justice, 65 the 
Seventh Circuit held that the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice and the Board of Immigration Appeals could debar attorneys. 
The plaintiff in Touche Ross attempted to distinguish these cases by 
emphasizing that the agencies involved exercised only judicial func-
tions, while the SEC is primarily an administrative and regulatory 
agency. Judge Timbers rejected the distinction, implying that the 
nature of an agency's functions does not determine whether it can 
discipline attorneys.66 
Assuming that Judge Timbers's conclusion is correct, one is left 
to wonder why the Supreme Court in Goldsmith relied so heavily on 
59. See Marsh, supra note 4, at 1009. 
60. Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 581 (2d Cir. 1979). 
61. William R. Carter, 22 SEC DOCKET 294 n.5. 
62. 270 U.S. 117 (1926). 
63. 270 U.S. at 121. The Board was authorized to make "rules of evidence and procedure" 
for its proceedings. 270 U.S. at 121. 
64. 205 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1953). 
65. 564 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1977). 
66. 609 F.2d at 581. 
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the "quasi-judicial'' duties of the Board of Tax Appeals in upholding 
its disciplinary authority.67 There is a logical explanation: a "quasi-
judicial" agency resembles a court, and a court has inherent author-
ity to discipline lawyers as a corollary to its power to admit attorneys 
to practice before it. 68 This suggests that the agencies in Goldsmith, 
Herman, and Koden had authority to discipline attorneys not only 
because their functions were "quasi-judicial," but also because they 
had authority to admit attorneys to practice before them. Indeed, 
each of these decisions assumes that the agency possesses authority 
to admit attorneys to practice, and then implies the corollary author-
ity to debar. 
This interpretation of the inherent authority cases suggests a 
plausible distinction between the SEC and the "quasi-judicial" agen-
cies. Congress never intended to give the SEC power to admit attor-
neys. Proponents of the Securities Act considered a provision that 
would have enabled the Commission to "approve" attorneys before 
"accept[ing] their statements," but rejected it because it ''would put a 
discretion in the hands of the Commission that mi~ht be danger-
ous."69 And in 1965, Congress amended the Admimstrative Proce-
dure Act to bar the SEC and most other agencies from imposing 
admission requirements for licensed attoraeys.70 Absent authority to 
admit attorneys, the SEC's inherent authority to discipline them can-
not follow as a corollary. 
B. Implied Authority 
The second justification for rule 2( e) is based squarely on the lan-
guage of the general rulemaking provisions: the SEC may discipline 
attorneys, it is asserted, because such a task is "necessary or appro-
priate" to implement the securities laws.71 This argument rests on a 
67. The Supreme Court in Goldsmith noted the "quasi-judicial" nature of the Board of Tax 
Appeals's duties and pointed out that most executive departments "in which interests of indi-
viduals as claimants or tax-payers are to be passed on by executive officers or boards" exercise 
authority to limit those who act for them. 270 U.S. at 121. 
68. See Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 605 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 
U.S. 905 (1977), overruled on other grounds, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 612 F.2d 
377 (8th Cir.), vacated, 101 S. Ct. 669 (1981); Schloetter v. Railoc, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th 
Cir. 1976); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975). 
69. Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 248 (1933) (statement of Ollie M. Butler). 
70. H.R. REP. No. 1141, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CoNo. & 
Ao. NEWS 4170, 4170-71. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500(b) (1976): 
An individual who is a member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a State 
may represent a person before an agency on filing with the agency a written declaration 
that he is currently qualified as provided by this subsection and is authorized to represent 
the particular person in whose behalf he acts. 
11. See Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 582 (1979); William R. Carter, Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC DOCKET 292, 294-95 (Feb. 28, 1981). 
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broad and arguably incorrect interpretation of the scope of general 
rulemaking provisions. 
Lacking more specific indications of congressional intent in stat-
utes or legislative history, courts have construed general.rulemaking 
provisions to uphold agency discretion if that discretion does not un-
dermine statutory goals. Some courts recognized that Congress 
could neither list every evil it sought to :proscribe72 nor catalogue 
every strategem for circumventing the policies of legislation;73 they 
reasoned that Congress impliedly .authorized rules meeting unfore-
seen conditions or promoting statutory objectives.74 Other courts 
upheld rules that responded to technical or complex problems out of 
deference to an agency's special expertise.75 The courts have thus 
sustained discretionary rulemaking when it responded to unforeseen 
or unforeseeable conditions, utilized agency expertise, or promoted 
the statutory purpose. They have often stated the test in the short-
hand of Mourning v. Family Publications Services, Inc. : a rule is au-
thorized if it is " 'reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling 
legislation.' "76 
Nevertheless, courts construe general rulemaking provisions 
more narrowly than Mourning or proponents of rule 2(e) suggest. 
FCC v. Midwest J/ideo Corp. 77 limited the Mourning test when it 
held that agency rules do not "reasonably relate" to legislative objec-
tives if they conflict with the statutory scheme. 78 In Midwest J/ideo, 
the Supreme Court struck down Federal Communications Commis-
sion rules requiring certain cable television systems to develop 
greater channel capacity and make channels available to public, edu-
cational, local government, and leased-access users. The FCC ar-
gued that its rules reasonably related to such statutory purposes as 
72. See Mourning v. Family Publications Servs., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 372 (1973) (quoting 
American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 309-10 (1953)). 
73. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941) (Congress could not cata-
logue all the devices and strategems for circumventing·the Act nor the whole gamut of reme-
dies to effectuate those policies in the variety of specific situations). 
74. E.g., Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969) (foonote omitted) (ruJe requir-
ing housing authorities to explain why they are evicting a tenant who lacks the financial means 
of providing a decent home without government aid furthers specific purpose of housing acts 
to provide "a decent home and a suitable environment for every American family." See gener-
ally Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940) ("Delegation by Con-
gress has long been recognized as necessary in order that the exertion oflegislative power does 
not become a futility."); S. REP. No. 960, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1928) (describing reason it 
delegates power); H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1928). 
75. Mourning v. Family Publications Servs., Inc., 411 U.S. at 371-72; FCC v. Schreiber, 
381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965) (relying on familiarity of administrative agencies with the industries 
they regulate); American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. at 310 (citing famili-
arity of agencies with industry conditions). 
76. 411 U.S. at 369 (quoting Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969)). 
77. 440 U.S. 689 (1979). 
78. 440 U.S. at 708. 
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"increasing outlets for local self-expression and augmenting the pub-
lic's choice of programs."79 Justice White rejected the Commission's 
insistence that the obligation imposed by the rules was "immaterial" 
so long as they promoted statutory objectives.80 He voided the rules 
because of "strong indications [in the statute] that agency flexibility 
was to be sharply delimited."81 Read together, Mourning and Mid-
west Video construe general rulemaking provisions to authorize rules 
that respond to unforeseen or unforeseeable conditions, utilize 
agency expertise, or promote legislative objectives, but preclude im-
plying authority that would conflict with the statutory scheme. SEC 
authority to discipline attorneys dissipates when rule 2(e) is sub-
jected to this more complex four-part test. 
Proponents of rule 2( e) might first argue that the rule responds to 
an abuse unforeseen by Congress when it enacted the securities laws: 
attorney misconduct in violation of SEC rules or procedures. In-
de'ed, Judge Timbers alluded to such an argument in Touche Ross.82 
The argument is untenable, however, because Congress was well 
aware of attorney misconduct both when it enacted the 1933 and 
1934 Acts and when it approved subsequent amendments. The press 
had noted the indispensability of lawyers to securities frauds long 
before 1934.83 During this period the public regarded lawyers as the 
mercenaries of shady entrepreneurs who indifferently lent their ex-
pertise to all sorts of wrongdoing. 84 And both Justice Stone85 and 
Professor (later Justice) Douglas86 published articles in 1934 expres-
79. 440 U.S. at 694-95 (citation omitted). 
80. 440 U.S. at 702. 
81. 440 U.S. at 708. 
82. See Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 580-81 (2d Cir. 1979). 
83. But just as a fine, natural football player needs coaching in the fundamentals and 
schooling in the wiles of the sport, so, too, it takes a corporation lawyer with a heart for 
the game to organize a great stock swindle or income tax dodge and drill the financiers in 
all the precise details of their play. 
Otherwise, in their natural enthusiasm to rush in and grab everything that happens not 
to be nailed down and guarded with shotguns, they would soon be caught off-side and 
penalized, and some of ihe noted financiers who are now immortalized as all-time all-
America larcenists never would have risen beyond the level of the petty thief or short-
change man. 
Pegler, N.Y. World Telegram, Jan. 24, 1923, at 19, quoted in Douglas, Directors Who IJo Nol 
Direct, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1329 n.65 (1934). 
84. Sommer, supra note 18, at 100. 
85. See Stone, The Public I'!fluence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1934) (reprinting 
speech that castigated corporate lawyers for their lack of concern for the public interest). 
86. See Douglas, supra note 83, at 1329 (footnote omitted): 
This lack of social mindedness has not been wholly or largely that of business. It has been 
equally shared by lawyers. It has been evidenced by the almost perverted singleness of 
purpose with which they have championed the cause of their clients, whether it be in the 
drafting of a deposit agreement, the handling of a merger, the conduct of a reorganization, 
or the marketing of securities. It resulted in getting accomplished what clients wanted but 
without regard for the long-term consequences of those accomplishments. 
See also Sommer, supra note 18, at 100-01 (quoting speech by Prof. Douglas in 1934): 
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sing concern over financial misconduct by attorneys. 87 Attorney 
misconduct was therefore quite foreseeable; by not specifying attor-
neys among those subject to SEC discipline or regulation, Congress 
apparently intended to leave attorney discipline to courts and bar 
associations. 
The Commission might next assert, as it did in William R Carter, 
that rule 2(e) falls within an area of the SEC's expertise because it 
regulates "securities lawyers performing disclosure-related profes-
sional services."88 Such an argument is misleading, however, be-
cause rule 2(e) governs not disclosure, but professional 
responsibility. 89 As the District of Columbia Circuit once observed 
in a case reversing a rule 2( e) suspension: ''This disbarment case 
involves a lawyer's reputation in the community, his livelihood, his 
self-esteem - his 'right.' It is not concerned with some speciality 
developed in the administration of the Act entrusted to the 
Agency."90 Admittedly, what professional ethics require in a given 
situation depends in some measure on the relevant substantive law, 
and no authority is more expert in securities law than the SEC.91 
But because courts and bar associations have great experience in 
punishing attorney misconduct in situations involving a host of com-
plex state and federal statutes, deference to agency expertise in the 
securities context seems unnecessary. 
It is sad but true that the high priest [sic] of the legal profession were active agents in 
making high finance a master rather than a servant of the public interest. They accom-
plished what their clients wanted accomplished and they did it efficiently, effectively, and 
with dispatch. They were tools or agenctes for the manufacture of synthetic securities and 
for the manipulation and appropriation of other people's money. In doing this they fol-
lowed the tradition of the guild. In fact, they were applying the teachings of their profes-
sors. They never took seriously the true nature of their public trust. They failed to act as 
conditioners of their clients' programs. They neglected their foremost function - to cre-
ate and maintain financial practices that were respectable, honest and conservative. 
87. Neither advocated SEC regulation oflawyers. Justice Stone, despite his assertion that 
the Bar bore some responsibility for evils of the stock market, Stone, supra note 85, at 9, 
continued to believe in attorney self-regulation: 
[W]e can continue to look to the Bar for the preservation and development of American 
institutions .... It will realize that expectation ... through the growing influence of the 
law schools, whose character ... determines the character of the legal profession; [and] 
through closer association and cooperation of this and other schools oflaw with the Bar in 
the worthy tasks of building up a new morale in the profession, fitted to the new condi-
tions under which it must do its work. 
Id. at 14. 
88. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC DocKET 292,296 (Feb. 28, 1981). 
89. Rule 2(e) on its face governs suspension or disbarment of attorneys who do not possess 
the requisite qualifications to represent others, lack character or integrity, engage in unethical 
or improper professional conduct, or willfully violate or aid and abet violations of the securi-
ties laws. Only the last ground for discipline seems to fall partially within the SEC's expertise; 
the other grounds are entirely matters of professional responsibility. 
90. Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
91. As the agency whose concern is compliance with the securities laws, the SEC does have 
expertise regarding violations. It could thus claim implied authority to discipline attorneys 
who under rule 2(e)(ili) have violated or aided and abetted violations of the securities laws, 
were it not for the statutory scheme which implies that the SEC has no such authority. 
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Both Touche Ross and William R Carter relied heavily on the 
third element of the Mourning-Midwest Video test to justify rule 2(e). 
Judge Timbers asserted that the rule was reasonably related to the 
principal purpose of the 1933 Act, which was "to provide investors 
with full disclosure of material information concerning public offer-
ings of securities in commerce."92 According to the court, breaches 
of professional responsibility can inflict great damage on investors.93 
It added that the Commission, with limited resources and a small 
staff, must rely for enforcement on professionals who appear and 
practice before it.94 Because competent and ethical attorneys pro-
mote that enforcement, the court reasoned, rule 2( e) furthers the dis-
closure policy of the securities laws.95 
Judge Timbers seems correct in assuming that attorneys who are 
subject to disciplinary proceedings under rule 2(e) are more likely to 
disclose material facts that their clients have revealed to them. But it 
would be unrealistic to assume that clients will continue to confide as 
readily in attorneys who are subject to independent ethical obliga-
tions to encourage disclosure and to disclose themselves.96 As the 
Commission itself recently acknowledged, "[l]awyers who are seen 
by their clients as being motivated by fears for their personal liability 
will not be consulted on difficult issues."97 
Even if rule 2( e) does promote disclosure or some other legiti-
92. Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 580 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976)). 
93. 609 F.2d at 581. The Court quoted United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 953 (1964): "In our complex society the accountant's certificates 
and the lawyer's opinion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the 
chisel or the crowbar." 
94. The court thus agreed with the Commission's frequent assertion that its small staff and 
limited resources justify the saddling of enforcement responsibilities on professionals. 609 
F.2d at 580-81. See, e.g., Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act Release 
No. 15,982, 17 SEC DOCKET ll49, ll62 (July 2, 1979) (Karmel, Commr., dissenting). See also 
Address by SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams before the Section of Corporation, Banking 
and Business Law of the ABA (Aug. 1980), reprinted in SEC. REo. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 566, 
Aug. 13, 1980, at H-1. · 
95. 609 F.2d at 581. 
96. Mandatory attorney disclosure of client misconduct would destroy the confidential re-
lationship between lawyer and client, without which the attorney's success in securing compli-
ance with the law could not succeed. Without the lawyer's strict ethical duty not to reveal 
client confidences, clients will not reveal those confidences even to the lawyers who could 
otherwise persuade them to pursue their interests legally. See Note, The Allorney-Cllent Privi-
lege After Allorney .Disclosure, 18 MICH. L. REv. 927, 934 (1980). Because disclosure docu-
ments can be prepared by intelligent laymen, clients may also dispense with other services, 
narrowing the attorney's role to rendering legal opinions. See Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant 
Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437,468 (1974). They may tum to 
paraprofessionals and other nonlegal assistants who are not bound by professional rules that 
require them to reveal their employer's fraud. This loss of the lawyer's expertise in preparing 
disclosure documents as well as counseling to secure compliance with legal obligations may 
prevent adequate disclosures to investors. 
97. William R. Carter, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC DOCKET 292, 
316-17 (Feb. 28, 1981). 
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mate statutory purpose, its validity cannot rest on that virtue alone. 
Under Midwest Video, the rule would still be unauthorized if it con-
travened the statutory scheme of the securities laws.98 And in fact, 
rule 2(e) seems inconsistent in two respects with "the pattern of the 
statute[s] taken as a whole."99 First, the conspicuous absence of pro-
visions authorizing the Commission to discipline or regulate attor-
neys, coupled with provisions authorizing discipline or regulation of 
virtually every other business and profession in the securities indus-
try, suggests that Congress did not contemplate SEC regulation of 
the bar. Second, rule 2(e) proceedings undermine the district courts' 
statutory jurisdiction over attorney misconduct. 
The abundance of regulatory and disciplinary provisions in the 
securities laws suggests that Congress did not intend the Commission 
to discipline attorneys. Congress has expressly authorized the SEC 
to discipline members of a variety of professions in the securities 
industry, including members and officers of n~tional securities ex-
changes, 100 brokers and dealers, 101 registered investment advisors, 102 
persons "associated" with a broker or dealer, 103 and municipal se-
curities dealers. 104 Congress has also expressly authorized the Com-
mission to regulate almost every business and profession in the 
industry, including accountants. 105 But Congress has been selective 
98. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708 (1979). 
99. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978). See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 , 
(1975) ("In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a 
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.") (citations 
omitted). 
100. Section 19(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1976), authorizes the SEC to suspend 
or expel members or officers of national securities exchanges. 
101. In 1936, Congress authorized the SEC to revoke the registration of brokers and deal-
ers. Act of May 27, 1936, ch. 462, § 3, 49 Stat. 1337 (1936) (current version codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 780) (1976 & Supp. I 1977). 
102. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(e)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 806-3(e)(4) (1976), ex-
pressly authorized the Commission to impose administrative sanctions on registered invest-
ment advisors. 
103. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3013, 3034-35. 
104. The Securities Act Amendments of 1975 authorized SEC proceedings against munici-
pal securities dealers. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 13, .89 Stat. 
131 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 780-4 (1976)). · 
105. See Klein, supra note 28, at 600. See generally§ 3(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c 
(1976) (listing and defining entities and persons regulated by the SEC). 
Section 19(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a)(l976), provides for SEC 
promulgation of accounting standards. This provision distinguishes rule 2( e) discipline of ac-
countants from discipline oflawyers. Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 15,982, 17 SEC DOCKET 1149, 1158 (July 2, 1979) (Karmel, Commr., dissenting). 
In addition to persons subject to SEC discipline, the list of persons and entities subject to SEC 
regulation includes: accountants, see note 20 supra; issuers and persons controlling or con-
trolled by issuers, Securities Act of 1933, § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1976); national securities 
exchanges, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976); persons who solicit, or 
permit the use of their name to solicit, proxies, consents, or authorizations in respect of regis-
tered securities, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976); brokers' and 
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in expanding the Commission's disciplinary and regulatory author-
ity. It resisted a Commission plea to extend section 15 of the 1934 
Act to allow proceedings against all "associated persons."106 This 
pattern suggests that when Congress desires to give the SEC author-
ity to discipline or regulate a particular group of people, it expressly 
provides that authority. Indeed, Congress has endorsed a District of 
Columbia Circuit opinion that reached this conclusion.107 Since 
none of the isolated references to lawyers in the original securities 
legislation or in subsequent amendments indicates that Congress 
contemplated SEC regulation or discipline of the bar,108 rule 2(e) 
undermines the statutory scheme. 
Rule 2( e) also conflicts with the pattern of the securities statutes 
by shifting the authority to adjudicate violations from the district 
courts to the SEC. Section 22 of the 1933 Act provides that the "dis-
trict courts ... shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations [of 
this Act] . . . and, concurrent with State and Territorial courts, of all 
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or 
duty created by this [Act]."109 Section 27 of the 1934 Act grants to 
the district courts "exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this 
[Act],"110 but, like the 1933 Act's jurisdiction provision, does not cre-
ate concurrent SEC jurisdiction. The SEC's only express authoriza-
tion to enforce the securities laws against a person not registered 
with the Commission is to seek injunctive relief in the federal district 
courts. 111 Thus Congress has given the courts, and not the SEC, ju-
risdiction over enforcement actions. 
Rule 2(e) proceedings undermine the district court's jurisdiction 
because the SEC uses them to reach the same conduct that it can 
dealers' associations, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1976); and clearing agencies, 15 U.S.C. § 78q-l 
(1976)). 
106. See Klein, supra note 28, at 642. 
107. The D.C. Circuit concluded that Congr~ expressly provided disciplinary or regula-
tory authority to the SEC when it so intended. Wallach v. SEC, 202 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1953). 
In Wallach, the Court held that the SEC could not join persons controlled by a broker-dealer 
in a revocation proceeding under the statute that then provided for discipline only of brokers 
and dealers. 202 F.2d at 463. In extending SEC disciplinary authority to persons associated 
with a broker or dealer, the 1964 Congress endorsed Wallach's reasoning. See H.R. REP, No. 
1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 3013, 
3034-35. For an attempt to distinguish Wallach,see Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 
580 n.16 (2d Cir. 1979). 
108. See note 18 supra. 
109. 1933 Act, § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1976). 
110. 1934 Act, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). 
111. Section 2l(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(d) (1976) provides: 
[W]henever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or is about to 
engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of this chapter • . • it may in its discre-
tion bring an action in the proper district court of the United States . . . to enjoin such 
acts or _practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or 
restrainmg order shall tie granted . . . . 
Section 20(b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976) is substantially the same. 
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reach through enforcement proceedings in the courts. This is most 
obvious where the rule 2(e) proceeding is grounded on a finding that 
the lawyer ''willfully violated" or ''willfully aided and abetted" a vi-
olation of the securities laws. Proceedings based on "improper pro-
fessional conduct" also rely on violations insofar as such conduct 
consists of failing to prevent a client's violation.112 Furthermore, the 
Commission has often grounded its rule 2( e) proceedings on conduct 
that is the subject of its parallel district court injunctive actions 
against others.113 The SEC thus reaches the same activity in rule 
2(e) administrative proceedings as Congress intended it to reach in 
injunctive suits in courts. 
The SEC has argued that rule 2( e) proceedings are distinguish-
able from enforcement actions; the former, it claims, assess the law-
yer's fitness to practice securities law, while the latter pursue 
enforcement as an end in itself. According to the Commission, rule 
2(e) is intended, not to provide an additional eµforcement remedy, 
but to address the lawyer's qualifications to represent others.114 Such 
an argument does not square with speeches by SEC Commissioners 
that acknowledge the enforcement purpose of rule 2( e) prosecu-
tions. m Nor is it consistent with the Commission's approach to rule 
2( e) prosecutions, which is to use rule 2( e) to threaten the bar so that 
it may rely on attorneys to enforce the securities laws. 116 The SEC's 
argument therefore fails, and rule 2( e) proceedings remain in conflict 
with the jurisdiction of the courts. 
Because rule 2(e) fails the Mourning-Midwest Video tests, SEC 
authority to discipline attorneys cannot be implied from the general 
rulemaking provisions of the securities laws. The only remaining 
justification for rule 2( e) lies in congressional intent in readopting 
the general rulemaking provisions. 
112. E.g., Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,982, 17 
SEC DOCKET 1149 (July 2, 1979). The case relied on K.M. & K.'s knowledge of material 
misstatements and omissions in its clients' filings with the Commission. 
I 13. Klein, supra note 28, at 635. See, e.g., Keating, Muething & Klekamp, 17 SEC 
DOCKET 1149. Virtually all of the remaining proceedings paralleled district court suits in 
which the SEC had already obtained injunctions against the attorneys. Klein, supra note 28, at 
635. 
114. See Brief for Appellee at 34 n.50, Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 
1979) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). In Securities Act Release No. 5088, at I (Sept. 
24, 1970), the Commission stated that its provision for discipline of willful violators or willful 
aiders and abettors: 
is merely a clarification of Commission practice under the present Rule 2(e), which pro-
vides for the disqualification from appearance or practice before the Commission of any 
person who the Commission finds . . . (i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to 
represent others, or (ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in un-
ethical or improper professional conduct. 
115. See notes 31 & 33 supra. 
116. See note 31 supra. 
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C. Authority by Congressional Rat!fication 
Rule 2( e) was promulgated over forty years ago, and since that 
time Congress has reenacted three times the general rulemaking pro-
visions upon which the SEC rests its authority to discipline attor-
neys.117 The Commission might therefore argue that Congress has 
ratified its construction of the rulemaking provisions - a construc-
tion that permits rule 2( e ). The Commission could correctly point 
out that courts often defer to agency constructions of statutes when 
the construction is long-standing and consistent, 118 or when later 
Congresses intended to adopt the agency's construction when the 
statute was reenacted. 119 
Nevertheless, the circumstances surrounding rule 2(e) suggest 
that in this case the agency's construction deserves little weight, and 
that later Congresses did not ratify the rule. This ratification argu-
ment fails for two reasons. First, the long time period during which 
rule 2(e) has existed establishes little. An agency's long-standing 
construction of its rulemaking authority carries little weight unless 
accompanied by evidence of congressional intent to authorize the 
regulation at issue.120 The Commission presented no such evidence 
when it promulgated rule 2(e).121 Second, Congress can ratify an 
agency's construction only if it considers that construction when it 
reenacts a statute.122 Contemporaneous construction "carries most 
weight when the administrators participated in drafting and directly 
made known their view to Congress in committee hearings." 123 
Nothing indicates that later Congresses had rule 2(e) in mind when 
they reenacted the general rulemaking provisions of the securities 
laws.124 Because rule 2( e) has been used extensively against attor-
neys only since the latest reenactment, 125 a general congressional 
117. See amendments to 15 U.S.C. § 78w: Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. 
94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975); Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 10, 78 Stat. 88a (1964); Act of May 27, 1936, 
§ 8, 49 Stat. 1379 (1936). 
118. See United States v. National Assn. of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975); Saxbe 
v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974). 
119. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). 
120. See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 119 (1978) ("(A]n agency may not bootstrap itself 
into an area in which it has no jurisdiction by repeatedly violating its statutory mandate.") 
(quoting Federal Maritime Commn. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745 (1973)); Adamo 
Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 287 n.5 (1978). Cf. Touche Ross & Co. v. Red-
ington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 n.18 (1979) ("(T]he language of the statute and not the [Commis-
sion's] rules must control") (citations omitted). 
121. See SEC, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 45-46 
(1935). 
122. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 193 n.28 (1969). 
123. 396 U.S. at 192. 
124. For the legislative histories of the 1975 and 1964 amendments, see (1975] U.S. Cool! 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 179; (1964] U.S. CODE CONG, & Ao. NEWS 3013. 
125. See text at notes 21-28 supra. More than 58% of the rule 2(e) proceedings between 
1950 and 1980 were brought after 1975. Marsh, supra note 4, at 988-89 (1980). 
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awareness should not be presumed. 126 The SEC therefore cannot 
justify rule 2(e) by reference to subsequent reenactments of its gen-
eral rulemaking authority. 
CONCLUSION 
Attorneys should be disciplined when their practice of securities 
law fails to conform to the highest standards of professional ethics. 
But one could reasonably doubt whether rule 2( e) proceedings are 
the best forum in which to define those standards and punish attor-
neys who fail to comply with them. Since there are alternative fo-
rums, and since the Securities and Exchange Commission lacks 
authority to enforce rule 2( e) against attorneys, courts should void 
sanctions imposed on attorneys in rule 2(e) proceedings. Until Con-
gress indicates a contrary intent, only courts and bar associations, the 
traditional sources of rules of professional responsibility, possess the 
authority to discipline attorneys. 
126. q: SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978) (courts should hesitate to presume con-
gressional awareness of agency construction from a few isolated statements in thousands of 
pages of legislative documents). 
